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Abstract
This paper discusses different growth trajectories in a selection of Latin American 
economies, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, comparing the phase 
of import substitution growth strategies with the more recent period of financial 
integration into the world economy. Our working hypothesis is that different 
growth trajectories result from the linkages between macroeconomic conditions 
and changes in production structures. When policy space becomes narrower, 
long-term growth performance is impaired and structural change will not usually 
enhance growth potential. We carry out an analysis based on the framework space 
methodology, which serves to compare phases of growth described as an evolving 
coupling of the dynamic profile of productivity growth (a supply-side condition) 
with the behaviour of capital accumulation (a demand-side condition). In light of 
the framework space comparative analysis, our main conclusion is that economic 
opening in the 1990s did nothing to further the catching-up process in any of the 
four economies.
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I. Introduction
Until the late 1970s, State-led import substitution industrialization was the dominant developmental 
strategy in most Latin American economies. This strategy was abandoned after the external debt crisis 
of the 1980s, which it took almost the whole decade to recover from. The ending of the long economic 
recession that followed the debt crisis (known as the “lost decade”) is associated with economic opening 
and a deepening process of financialization in the region.1 
As part of the financialization process, trade liberalization, privatization and financial deregulation 
became the main economic policy recommendations, and the management of monetary and fiscal 
policies came to be largely subordinated to the views of the international financial markets. As argued 
by Ocampo and Vos (2008), policy space in developing economies, and in Latin American economies 
in particular, has narrowed greatly since economic opening.2 According to these authors, this narrowing 
has meant a loss of autonomy for economic authorities when it comes to implementing “effective 
countercyclical macroeconomic policies consistent with longer-term development objectives and 
developmental policies” (p. 29).3 Their main argument is that, capital flows being procyclical, economic 
opening restricts the authorities’ ability to manage countercyclical economic policy in response to booms 
and busts. Indeed, Ocampo (2007) argues that capital flows to developing countries “exacerbate rather 
than dampen both economic booms and recessions” (p. 9). 
Interest in the growth strategies of Latin American economies has recently revived, with Bárcena 
and Prado (2016), for example, presenting a discussion of the different phases of Latin American growth 
since the 1980s. On the basis of the region’s economic cycles, which have mostly been determined by 
external shocks, the study proposes a criterion for identifying different growth periods. In the structuralist 
tradition, structural change is assumed to depend on the strength and continuity of investment in capital 
accumulation, this being the main force driving and sustaining growth. Since investment is the most 
dynamic component of aggregate demand, short-term macroeconomic policy management, conducted 
in the interests of higher long-term growth, must succeed in curbing volatility in the main macroeconomic 
prices and in maintaining a countercyclical fiscal stance, a low and stable long-term inflation rate, low 
real interest rates and a real exchange rate that is competitive over time. 
Our main focus in this paper is on the different growth trajectories of four Latin American 
economies, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico,4 comparing the period of import substitution 
growth strategies with the more recent period of financial integration into the world economy. Our 
working hypothesis is that different growth trajectories result from the linkages between macroeconomic 
conditions and changes in the production structure. In this light, economic policy plays an important 
role in explaining the growth process, thus influencing the long-term trajectory. When policy space 
diminishes, long-term growth performance is impaired and structural change does not contribute to an 
increase in growth potential. In other words, we assume that structural change is important in explaining 
long-term growth performance, but that it does not occur smoothly and generally results in unbalanced 
growth with consequences for internal and external equilibria. For potential output to increase, then, 
1 Financialization can broadly be defined as taking place when financial markets, actors, practices and representations have a 
growing impact on social structures and dynamics (see Epstein, 2005).
2 China and India are rare examples of cautious financial integration, and it is no coincidence that they have performed better 
than other developed and developing economies since the international financial crisis. See Nassif, Feijo and Araújo (2016) for 
a discussion of the economic performance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) since the financial crisis.
3 Rey provides another way of looking at the loss of autonomy in financially integrated developing countries’ economic policies. 
In a recent and influential paper, the author argues that independent monetary policies are possible in developing economies 
only if the capital account is managed (Rey, 2015).
4 See, for instance, Moreno and Pérez (2009), who mention that these were the economies that followed a State-led industrialization 
strategy. They were also responsible for over 50% of total manufacturing value added in Latin America in the 2010s.
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the policy space should be enlarged so that long-term policies (such as industrial and technological 
policies) can be closely coordinated with short-term macroeconomic policies.5 
To argue this point, we shall conduct our analysis on the basis of the framework space methodology, 
which will allow us to compare phases of growth, described as an evolving coupling of the dynamic 
profile of productivity growth (a supply-side condition) with the behaviour of capital accumulation 
(a  demand-side condition). Interaction between these two drivers naturally generates a non-linear 
growth trajectory, punctuated by discrete jumps or discontinuities, and of course this trajectory need 
not tend towards any predetermined equilibrium position (as predicted in conventional theory). As a 
bonus, the framework space methodology will allow us to interpret the phases of economic growth 
with reference to either the Kaldorian or the neo-Schumpeterian position, and classify accordingly the 
various structural changes Latin American economies have undergone. Thus, the main contribution 
of this paper is to provide an analytical interpretation, based on the framework space methodology, of 
the differences in the growth trajectories of these four Latin American economies. 
After this Introduction, section II introduces the framework space methodology. Section III identifies 
three periods associated with different growth trajectories, and these are analysed in section IV for 
each individual economy, the contribution of this section being to interpret each country’s historical 
growth record on the basis of the empirical framework space evidence, thereby providing an overview 
of each economy. Our main conclusion in the light of the framework space comparative analysis is 
that economic opening in the 1990s did nothing to further the catching-up process in any of the four 
economies. Section V summarizes our main conclusions.
II. The framework space methodology
The conventional approach to long-term growth implicitly assumes that real-world economies tend in 
the long run to a particular path forming part of a stable regime, and that this is so strong an attractor 
that any shorter-run dynamics are transient movements and practically irrelevant.6 However, observed 
data fluctuate all the time, so growth patterns should be evaluated against the dynamics of related 
variables. To deal with this issue, the framework space methodology incorporates a menu of growth 
models, and it is from this menu that actual patterns of growth are constructed.7
The framework space is an analytical device used to focus on variables such as capital accumulation, 
employment and productivity. The primary justification for choosing these is, of course, that they are the 
variables employed by the growth theories familiar to us. The framework space takes only the rate of 
growth in investment per employee (on the vertical scale) and the rate of growth in labour productivity 
(on the horizontal scale) (see Böhm and Punzo, 2001, p. 48). The purpose of this selection is to explain 
the relationship between the dynamics of fluctuations in productivity and the dynamics of fluctuations 
in investment per employee. Construction of the framework space starts with the GDP or value added 










5 Following the Kaleckian tradition, Titelman and Pérez (2016, p. 162) express this as follows: “A first important implication to 
arise from the analysis is that macroeconomics for development should not present cycle and trend or the short and long run 
as dichotomous elements. Short-term fluctuations do affect long-term outcomes.”
6 This prediction is crystal clear in neoclassical theory, which holds that the rate of economic growth in the steady state eventually 
arrived at will depend only on population growth and technical progress. It was this clarity that brought it to prominence as a 
theory and as a set of econometrically falsifiable propositions.
7 A full presentation and discussion of the framework space approach can be found in Böhm and Punzo (1992, 1994 and 2001), 
Brida and Punzo (2003), Gaffard and Punzo (2005) and Feijo, Punzo and Lamonica (2012).
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where gv is the growth rate of output per employee (a measure of productivity growth) and gi is the 
growth rate of investment per employee. The variables gv and gi provide the coordinates for the dynamic 
trajectory of a given economy in the plane (figure 1). Changes in coordinate levels (gv, gi) represent 
changes in the dynamic relationship of the economy analysed and may signify a shift in the intensity of 
changes in the variables or the regime, i.e. structural change.8
Figure 1 shows how to interpret growth trajectories and their phases in the framework space 
apparatus. Six standard growth regimes and one special growth regime are dealt with in this framework. 
The latter is the line that intersects the plane of the coordinates (gv, gi) at 45 degrees; this is the 
so-called Harrodian corridor9 separating regime IV above the line from regime I below the line. Both 
regime VI (accumulation) and regime I (innovation) are in the first quadrant where economic growth 
occurs, i.e. where rates of productivity growth (gv) and investment per employee (gi) are positive. 
Regime II (restructuring), in the second quadrant, combines a positive gv and a negative gi. The other 
regimes, III, IV and V, are treated in the analytical structure of the framework space as reflections of the 
regimes mentioned above. 
Figure 1 













Source: Prepared by the authors.
8 Structural change is interpreted differently in other approaches. It can occur when there are changes in the composition of 
GDP or economic aggregates, or when there is a change in the organizational and institutional structure of an economy. In 
Kaldor’s view, structural change is observed when there are changes in the composition of manufacturing industry in respect of 
technological intensity, captured by the elasticities of demand for exports and imports. Thus, according to the Kaldor-Thirlwall 
model, a structural change might be favourable or unfavourable to the growth of an economy in which the balance of payments 
is in equilibrium. See Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) and Thirlwall (1979). Also, structural change implies an interrelation between 
supply and demand forces accounting for growth trajectories. A large body of literature associated with endogenous growth 
theory supports this approach (De Long and Summers, 1991; León-Ledesma, 2002; Syverson, 2010). León-Ledesma (2002), for 
instance, estimated a structural model for a set of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
over the period 1965–1994. In addition to the impacts of investment and the traditional Kaldor-Verdoorn law, the paper also 
captures the direct and indirect effects of innovation and technical progress on the behaviour of labour productivity. In the author’s 
words, “innovation not only leads to a higher degree of product differentiation and quality but also to process innovation leading 
to increased productivity” (León-Ledesma, 2002, p. 204).
9 Harrodian behaviour is represented by the steady-state trajectories. The coordinates (0,0) are associated with the exogenous 
growth trajectory (Böhm and Punzo, 2001, p. 53) with a zero rate of technological progress (see below).
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The relevant interpretation for our argument is that the framework space is endowed with three 
categories of growth regimes: (i) steady state; (ii) accumulation, where the focus is on changes in the 
intensity of investment, with productivity rising with capital accumulation (assuming technical progress 
is incorporated);10 and (iii) innovation, which is functionally independent of capital accumulation, 
growth in this case being explained by innovations, be they new organizational forms or processes 
or the introduction of new products that increase the gap between unit costs and the final price. The 
growth trajectory is given by the sequence formed as a function of the pairs of gv and gi, distributed 
in the framework space plane. Each point in the framework space where these coordinates intersect 
is associated with a growth trajectory.
The framework space can be related straightforwardly to the predictions of the conventional 
theories. For example, neoclassical theory identifies a unique global attractor, a steady-state path in 
which the growth rate gNC is defined as:11
 g nNC m= +  (3) 
where n is the rate of population growth and λ is technical progress. However, the observed rate of 
economic growth g will usually be different from this exogenous growth. The framework space thus 
attempts to explain the endogenous rate of growth gEN as the deviation from the steady-state growth rate.12
 g g n–EN m= +R W (4)
The framework space takes the gNC rate as the starting point for figure 1, i.e. the coordinates (0,0), 
in order to carry out the analysis of the endogenous growth rate. We thus assume that the behaviour 
of the effective rate g influences the long-term trajectory and thence that the endogenous growth rate 
can be explained by two regimes or growth models: capital accumulation and innovation.
In sum, all long-term theories are present in the two-dimensional framework space. The Solow (1957) 
model is the starting point, and the observed points lying elsewhere are associated with endogenous 
growth13 that can be explained by both the theory, i.e. capital accumulation, and the innovation regime.
10 See Kaldor (1957) and Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962), among others.
11 It should be noted that in the neoclassical theory there is no clear distinction between a growth accumulation regime and a 
growth innovation regime when technical progress is assumed to be exogenous. To incorporate technical progress into modern 
growth theory, the production factors of capital (K) and labour (L) are modified, and the traditional aggregate production function 
Y = Y(K,L) can be written with the addition of a time-dependent multiplier A(t) that incorporates overall technical progress. 
Thus, according to Romer (2012, p. 10), the neoclassical aggregate production function incorporating technical progress can 
be written as: Y(t) = F(K(t), A(t)L(t)), where t denotes time. According to Aghion and Howitt (2009), however, this modification 
of the traditional production function to incorporate technical progress still leaves unexplained how this is incorporated. Thus, 
A(t) can be seen as a useful modelling device, but one with little explanatory power.
12 León-Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002) tested the hypothesis of the endogeneity of the natural rate of growth for a group of 15 OECD 
countries, as did Libânio (2009) for the group of the 12 largest economies in Latin America, in both cases successfully. The 
natural rate of growth rises in periods of expansion and declines during periods of contraction because the labour force and 
productivity growth are elastic to the growth of demand and output.
13 Endogenous models with an emphasis on situations of imbalance are inspired by the contributions of Richard Goodwin. See 
Punzo (2006).
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III. Growth trajectories in the period 1951–2014: 
an overview of the growth performance 
of the four selected economies
To shed some light on how to identify distinct phases which may be associated with distinct growth 
regimes in the selected economies, we shall first draw on some indicators related to the evolution of 
the manufacturing sector.
In the Kaldorian tradition, development is not sectorally neutral, and a special role is assigned 
to manufacturing industry in driving and sustaining long-term growth rates. Table 1 presents some 
indicators for the evolution of the share of manufacturing value added and international manufacturing 
trade over time.
Table 1 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: selected manufacturing sector indicators, selected years
(Percentages)
Share of total 
Latin American 
manufacturinga 
Manufacturing as  
a share of GDP
Manufacturing exports 
as a share of GDP
Manufacturing imports 
as a share of GDP
1990 2015 1965 1980 2000 2015 1965 1980 2000 2015 1965 1980 2000 2015
Argentina 7.4 8.7 41.2 29.5 17.8 17.2 5.6 23.2 32.5 29.3 62.2 77.3 87.0 82.0
Brazil 39.0 32.1 26.2 33.5 15.3 11.4 7.7 37.2 58.4 38.1 50.3 40.8 73.3 75.9
Chile 2.5 3.5 24.0 21.5 16.9 11.9 3.9 9.1 16.2 14.4 63.7 59.6 71.4 74.7
Mexico 22.5 26.3 19.5 22.3 20.3 18.4 16.3 11.9 83.5 82.4 82.4 74.9 83.5 81.8
Total 71.4 70.5 24.9 27.1 17.5 14.0 9.3 18.5 51.3 50.8 70.9 64.4 77.2 78.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-
development-indicators.
a Manufacturing value added in constant 2010 dollars.
The first two columns (estimates for Brazil are available from 1990 onward) show the relative 
contribution of each country to the manufacturing industry total in Latin America. Although Brazil’s 
share declined during the 1990s and 2000s, it is still the most industrialized economy in the region. 
The next four columns present the GDP share of manufacturing industry for each country and the 
whole region. The industrialization trend is illustrated in the last row, the manufacturing share of GDP. 
For the region as a whole, it increased from 1965 to 1980 and decreased afterwards. At the country 
level, it increased in Brazil and Mexico from 1965 to 1980, while it decreased in all the selected Latin 
American countries in the ensuing decades. The early 1980s can be identified as a period when deep 
changes occurred in the growth trajectory of Latin American economies, all of which were badly hit by 
the debt crisis. 
The remaining eight columns present the evolution of the share of manufacturing goods in total 
exports and imports. This increased in all the selected economies from the 1960s to 2000. The share 
of manufactures in Mexican exports decreased from 1965 to 1980, but had sharply increased again 
by 2000, following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. The 
share of manufacturing exports decreased in all the economies from 2000 to 2015. If compared with 
1965, however, it was still significantly higher in the latter year, mostly as a result of the industrialization 
process. If the beginning and end dates are taken, the share of manufacturing imports also generally 
increased. However, it decreased from 1965 to 1980 everywhere except Argentina. 
Between 1980 and 2000, manufacturing imports generally increased, following the analogous 
movement in exports. From 2000 to 2015, while the shares of manufacturing exports decreased, 
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shares of manufacturing imports increased everywhere except Argentina. As far as flows of trade in 
manufacturing goods are concerned, therefore, the time period from 1980 to 2000 exhibits a significant 
change in the trade balance of the region’s economies that might point to a significant change in the 
growth regime as well. 
Table 2 presents GDP growth rates for the economies concerned in selected time periods. These 
have been chosen to capture different growth trajectories and transition periods for a single indicator, 
the average GDP growth rate over the time interval (the phase). Table 3 provides a summary of the 
main characteristics of each.
Table 2 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: gross domestic product (GDP)a  
growth rates, selected periods
(Percentages)
Phase 1 (1951–1981) Phase 2 (1982–1999) Phase 3 (2000–2014)
Argentina 2.9 2.1 3.3
Brazil 7.0 2.3 3.3
Chile 3.6 4.6 4.2
Mexico 6.6 2.1 2.5
Source: University of Groningen, Penn World Tables 9.0 [online database] https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/
pwt/pwt-releases/pwt9.0?lang=en.
a Real GDP at constant prices in millions of 2011 dollars.
Table 3 
Proposed phases of economic growth
Period Description
Phase 1 1951–1981 Growth regime based on State-led import substitution industrialization 
Phase 2 1982–1999 Debt crisis and consolidation of economic opening
Phase 3 2000–2014 Growth regime based on economic integration in an asymmetrical world
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Phase 1, the period of State-led industrialization, captures the period that was most dynamic in 
Brazil and Mexico, the most industrialized countries in the region. Phase 2 covers the “lost decade”, 
as it was in most Latin American economies, plus the period of greatest instability in foreign markets, 
associated with the Asian and Russian crises of the 1990s. The movement from phase 1 to phase 2 
was a time when policy space narrowed in most economies, owing among other things to the shortage 
of international liquidity for heavily indebted economies. Phase 2 is thus treated as a transition to a 
new growth regime. Phase 3, on the other hand, is characterized by the consolidation of this new 
growth regime, marked by greater financial and trade integration.14 The phases thus involve different 
growth models.
In sum, within the overall period, the two main phases are the first and the third, the second 
representing a transition. The phase of State-led import substitution industrialization was characterized 
by industrialization as the engine of development. State intervention in different domains of economic 
activity was the main driver of investment decisions, and development had a strong orientation towards 
the domestic market. However, this rapid industrialization led to external imbalances that culminated 
in the external debt crisis. Economic opening was the strategy for overcoming the shortage of external 
14 The third phase was characterized by deeper financial integration of the economies. Contrary to the assumptions of neoclassical 
theory, structural change towards more diversified and technologically advanced production sectors was not observed. Indeed, 
as Amsdem (2001, p. 85) has shown, “as a catching up strategy, free trade policies seem to have been limited to Switzerland and 
Hong Kong.” Chang (2003, p. 2) also emphasized that most developed countries “adopted industrial and commercial policies” 
considered bad “in the assessment of the neoclassical current, such as protection of nascent industry and export subsidies.”
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liquidity. The transition period was characterized by structural and market reforms that occurred mostly 
during the 1980s and 1990s along the lines of the Washington Consensus. They were characterized by 
liberalization that unleashed market forces, seen as the most efficient way of allocating resources. This 
phase stood in sharp contrast to the orientation of the first phase, as the State and other non-market 
institutions were considered a “second-best” solution. Phase three was one of a new growth regime 
in which the economies were more integrated with one another and globally but also more susceptible 
to external shocks. 
IV. Interpreting growth trajectories 
in the framework space
A growth regime qualitatively identifies a specific growth dynamic, generated by a given growth model. 
Hence, while a trajectory is any generic sequence of growth paths, a growth regime dynamic is the 
representation of a trajectory’s qualitative features distilled via the properties of its regime representation 
(Böhm and Punzo, 1992 and 1994; Brida and Punzo, 2003). In the framework space, therefore, an 
economy’s actual trajectory (its historical growth experience) is sequenced as a string of growth 
paths within or across regimes, or both. When growth paths span more than one regime, we talk of 
a change in regime as a qualitative change in the growth model, and this discontinuity is understood 
as a manifestation of an underlying structural change, rendered explicit or “emerging” through certain 
qualitative aspects of the economy’s observed dynamics. Combining the notions implied in the framework 
space methodology with our predetermined segmentation into historical phases, we get a variety of 
possible ways of accounting for long-term growth trajectories.
It is the combination of qualitatively distinct growth trajectories, the regime dynamics, that we 
want to examine. Using the framework space, we can analyse the growth trajectories of the four 
selected economies under the assumption (introduced hereafter) that they were to a great extent 
operating under the same external economic conditions. Thus, different country trajectories might be 
interpreted as specific responses to domestic macroeconomic policy management measures impacting 
both productivity and investment performance. Figure 2 presents the trajectory of our four economies 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) in the predefined growth phases. Table 4 summarizes their growth 
trajectories as seen through the framework space instrument.15
15 See annex A1 for a description of the variables in figure 2.
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Figure 2 




































0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7
(gv. gi) 45° reference line
A. Argentina B. Brazil
C. Chilea D. Mexico
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Note: See annex A1 for explanations of the terms.
a Starts in 1952.
Table 4 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: Summary of growth trajectories
Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
Phase 1 (1951–1981) Accumulation Innovation Accumulation Innovation
Phase 2 (1982–1999) Accumulation Accumulation Accumulation Retrenchment
Phase 3 (2000–2014) Innovation Innovation Accumulation Accumulation
Source: Prepared by the authors.
1. Phase 1: the State-led import substitution 
industrialization growth regime (1951–1981)
After the Second World War, the large countries of Latin America embarked on a process of industrialization 
based on import substitution in industry16 and strict control of exchange rates. External borrowing was 
stimulated and was reflected in high investment rates. The 1960s and 1970s are often seen as a golden 
age in Latin American economic history.17
16 Industrialization based on protectionist policies favouring infant heavy industries received a strong impetus in the 1950s, with 
Prebisch’s centre-periphery model being a strong influence.
17 See, for instance, Bértola and Ocampo (2012).
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As a growth regime, State-led industrialization centred on a set of institutional arrangements 
aimed at promoting structural change with a view to catching up more quickly with mature economies. 
Brazil and Mexico are examples of successful import substitution industrialization strategies. Figure 2 
shows that this phase was the one in which productivity growth rates were the highest on average for 
these economies. In both cases, the growth trajectory falls in the innovation quadrant, with average 
aggregate productivity growth exceeding average growth in investment per worker over the period. 
This result can be seen as a clear indication that the increase in aggregate productivity resulted from 
the intensification of the industrialization process. In both countries, industrialization was based on 
protectionist policies, i.e. at each step of the import substitution process, governments targeted certain 
industries as priorities for industrial policy and used both import licences and high tariffs to protect the 
manufacturing sector.18
The Argentine industrialization process took a different route. Argentina has comparative 
advantages in its agricultural sector because it is endowed with large areas of fertile land. Thus, 
industrialization entailed displacement of the dynamic centre of agricultural and livestock activities to 
manufacturing. Industrialization ended in 1976 (see Ferrer, 2004; Câmara and Vernengo, 2013), when 
a neoliberal economic policy agenda took over the economy, leaving the process unfinished. In the 
period from 1951 to 1981, Argentina’s growth trajectory falls into the accumulation quadrant (figure 2), 
and the striking feature of the Argentine pattern of development since the War is not so much State-
led industrialization as the political instability marking the country’s development (see Câmara and 
Vernengo, 2013, pp. 115–116). Indeed, the 1976 military coup was an attempt to return Argentina to 
the economically liberal agricultural export growth model of the country’s “glorious past” (Ferrari and 
Cunha, 2008, p. 27). Orthodox methods were used in an attempt to curb persistently rising inflation,19 
and the economy had stagnated by the end of the decade.20 
The Chilean growth pattern in 1952–1981 also falls into the accumulation quadrant, indicating 
that the structural change promoted by the import substitution industrialization strategy did not alter 
the most important characteristics of the economy, with its heavy dependence on mineral extraction. 
In fact, the State–led orientation of the Chilean economy reached into all economic sectors. Between 
1964 and 1973, Chile implemented a process of agrarian reform that affected 50% of agricultural land. 
In 1971, all mineral wealth was nationalized and the National Copper Corporation of Chile (CODELCO) 
was created and became the country’s largest exporter, as it still is. Financial markets were regulated 
by the State. However, the military coup of 1973 moved the economy to a radical neoliberal agenda, 
very quickly reducing the presence of the State through an extensive privatization programme that 
encompassed public enterprises, banks and even social security, the promotion of private health 
insurance and the expansion of private education. Economic opening entailed internationalization of 
the financial sector. These economic reforms exposed the economy to movements in international 
financial markets, and consequently the Mexican default of 1981 badly hit Chilean GDP, which dropped 
by over 10% in 1982.21
The import substitution industrialization strategy was virtually abandoned by Brazil after Mexico’s 
external default of 1982. Indeed, State-led strategies of this type were eventually to be abandoned in 
18 In Brazil, industrial policy actively fostered industrialization, and national development plans were launched to deal with major 
disequilibria in the trade balance, mainly during the 1970s. Brazilian industrialization was largely dependent on foreign savings; 
paradoxically, balance-of-payment crises reinforced government arguments in favour of renewing the use of protectionist 
instruments and import substitution. The import substitution strategy followed by Mexico, which was also based on protectionist 
policies, followed a different route from the 1960s, with the protectionist regime relying increasingly on import licences and 
less on tariff protection. According to Ros (1993), the essential criterion for granting import licences was the availability of 
domestic supplies. 
19 In 1978, the plan implemented by the neoliberal minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz failed completely and there was a 
banking crisis.
20 Before the Mexican moratorium, Argentina had the highest ratio of external debt to GDP in Latin America.
21 According to the World Development Indicators, in 2005 dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP).
107CEPAL Review Nº 134 • August 2021
Carmem Feijo, Lionello Franco Punzo and Marcos Tostes Lamônica
most Latin American countries, their main flaw being that they relied on running external deficits and 
resorting to increasing amounts of external borrowing, a strategy that was unsustainable mainly because 
of the high volatility associated with external financing. Their abandonment was thus the result of the 
behaviour of both the trade and capital balances, as this meant that investment, the main variable 
when it comes to expanding aggregate income and output, was unsustainable. A common criticism 
of the import substitution strategy is that it left little room for export-led growth because excessive 
protectionism generated inefficiencies in industrial production. The lack of dynamism in export earnings 
became a major bottleneck for import substitution industrialization, since the industrial sector was 
import-intensive (Sapelli, 2003). 
The golden age of the Latin American economies, during which structural change favoured 
industrialization, came to an end with Mexico’s external moratorium. 
2. Phase 2: the debt crisis, the consolidation 
of economic opening and the transition 
to a new growth regime (1982–1999)
The virtual abandonment of the developmentalist agenda guiding Latin American growth strategies 
after the Second World War was the result of the external debt crisis.22 The increase in foreign debt 
after the sharp rise in international interest rates led to the implementation of recessionary policies in 
pursuit of external adjustments in all indebted countries. Sharp devaluations of domestic currencies 
following balance-of-payments crises led to rising domestic prices. In a word, policy space narrowed 
substantially in the Latin American economies once developmentalist policies were departed from. 
According to the framework space (figure 2), all the economies entered a process of reduction 
in the growth rates of both productivity and investment per worker during phase 2. 
Following the Mexican external moratorium of 1982, and as the financial fragility of the public 
sector worsened, Brazilian inflation became entrenched. High inflation dominated the macroeconomic 
situation in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, during which time several anti-inflationary plans were 
launched, though with little or no success. At the same time, development strategies lost ground in 
the economic debate as renegotiation of the external debt became the main economic policy priority. 
High inflation was eventually defeated with the Real Plan of 1994, while trade liberalization reforms 
were introduced in the early 1990s, relatively late in comparison with the other economies selected. 
However, they were implemented very quickly: between 1988 and 1994, most non-trade barriers were 
banished and the nominal import tariff was reduced from 39.6% to 11.2% (simple average), with the 
standard deviation dropping from 14.6% to 5.9% (Kume, Piani and De Souza, 2003, p. 11). Of all the 
economic reforms adopted in Brazil, though, the opening up of the short-term capital account was 
probably most responsible for exposing the domestic economy to the instability of the world economy 
and also for reducing the contribution of monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies to the maintenance 
of growth. If, on the one hand, opening up the economy helped to stabilize chronic inflation, on the other, 
it contributed to the emergence of a new cyclical trend of real-term currency appreciation that made 
the economy more vulnerable to external shocks. Lastly, financial integration and a fixed exchange-rate 
regime proved to be inconsistent with each other, and speculative attacks against Asian currencies 
and the Russian rouble forced Brazil to adopt a flexible exchange-rate regime in January 1999. New 
economic policy arrangements that included inflation targeting, a primary surplus and a flexible exchange 
rate were implemented in June the same year. 
22 Moreno and Pérez (2009, p. 37) state: “By the 1980’s, the debt crisis which caused the largest drop in output growth in the 
region’s history and affected most of Latin American countries, was used as the leitmotif to launch a devastating critique of 
earlier developmental policies and to recommend policies based on the mantra ‘stabilize, privatize and liberalize’.”
108 CEPAL Review Nº 134 • August 2021
The growth trajectories of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: a comparative view through the framework space lens
The Mexican reaction to the debt crisis was to begin reversing the State intervention policies 
implemented in the previous phase. Thus, the first “globalization phase” of the Mexican economy 
started in the mid-1980s, when trade liberalization policies began to be implemented. In 1986, Mexico 
acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The government quickly began to 
dismantle the system of trade protection, liberalize the financial market and shrink the public sector by 
carrying out privatizations and reducing public spending. Consistently low inflation became the main 
macroeconomic goal, as this was seen as a necessary and largely sufficient condition for setting the 
economy on a path of strong and lasting export-led, labour-intensive growth. Liberal policies did not 
achieve the results hoped for, however, and integration into the world economy resulted in low growth 
and increase dependence on oil exports. Indeed, the growth path from 1982 to 1999 was the worst for 
the Mexican economy since the Second World War. In 1994, Mexico entered NAFTA, and an immediate 
consequence was the dismantling of the country’s production chains, which made room for the maquilas. 
The specialization of Mexican industry in high-technology sectors actually led to deindustrialization in 
basic manufacturing, which in turn limited the growth of domestic demand (Levy-Orlik, 2012, p. 246). 
Besides the intensification of the deindustrialization process, a speculative attack on the domestic 
currency in 1994 exposed, according to Ibarra and Blecker (2014), the very limited ability of domestic 
policy to anchor monetary stabilization in a fixed exchange-rate regime. The recovery of the Mexican 
economy due to its integration into North American supply chains is observed in the following phase.23
Argentina was the economy with the worst growth trajectory of the four in phase 1, and a sequence 
of economic plans changed its economic landscape dramatically during phase 2. As we have seen, 
the movement towards liberal economic policies started earlier in Argentina, when the liberal economic 
platform centred on monetarist policies was established. In 1982, Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands 
(or Malvinas) and came into conflict with the United Kingdom. The result was a massive depreciation of 
the peso, severe inflation and the accumulation of sizeable external debts. During the 1980s, growth 
rates were low, and persistently high inflation became a chronic problem which was aggravated by 
serious episodes of capital flight towards the end of the decade. In 1991, a controversial plan to fight 
inflation was launched, whereby the peso was made fully convertible with the dollar at a fixed rate.24 
This reduced inflation sharply, but the fixed exchange rate lowered the cost of imports, leading to the 
flight of dollars from the country and a massive loss of industrial infrastructure and employment. The 
recovery of the Argentine economy in the early 1990s was associated with the stabilization of inflation 
and economic opening. Cunha and Ferrari (2009) claim that Argentina pushed neoliberal policies to an 
extreme with its adoption of the currency convertibility system in 1991. While the convertibility programme 
eliminated hyperinflation, it evinced little ability to absorb external shocks (Cunha and Ferrari, 2009, p. 7). 
The fixed exchange rate stimulated the expansion of private consumption, which was financed with 
increasing external borrowing. In a context of greater instability in international financial markets during 
the 1990s, Argentina became more and more dependent on official resources, financial packages led 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and funding from the private debt market. The unsustainability 
of this macroeconomic arrangement came to a head with the 2001 moratorium: in December 1991, 
Argentina’s total external debt was US$ 62 billion, equivalent to 32% of GDP, but by 2001 debt exceeded 
US$ 140 billion, more than 50% of GDP (Cunha and Ferrari, 2009, p. 14). 
The Chilean economy was the most integrated in the 1980s, since Chile had abandoned the 
import substitution-based model in the early 1970s. Like all other Latin American economies, though, 
23 Since Mexico entered the international market via global supply chains, multinational corporations have taken on a central role 
in production. Thus, structural change in the country during the most acute phase of economic liberalism did not prevent it 
becoming financially and technologically dependent (mainly on the United States), although it did lead to diversification and to 
an increase in industry’s share of the economy and the technology content of exports (Levy-Orlik, 2012, p. 237).
24 It should be noted that the early years of convertibility were very buoyant in terms of domestic income growth and success in 
fighting chronic inflation (Ferrari and Cunha, 2008, p. 50). Between 1991 and 1998, the annual average growth rate of Argentina 
was around 6%.
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Chile suffered a severe external crisis in the aftermath of the Mexican moratorium. Its currency was 
heavily devalued in 1982, sending the economy into a steep recession. GDP shrank by 13.2% in 1982 
and 2.8% in 1983. The economic authorities adopted a number of measures to attract foreign capital, 
and much of the country’s private external debt was turned into public external debt as a result of 
interventions in the financial system. To reduce this debt, the government opted for so-called debt for 
equity swaps, a mechanism whereby it offered to repurchase the bonds of foreign investors holding 
Chilean debt at par, but in Chilean pesos and provided that the capital was reinvested in the country. 
Years later, when the economy had stabilized, the merits of this Chilean solution to the crisis were 
recognized. Economic opening and early integration into the world economy led to resources being 
reallocated to industrial sectors targeting the external market (Carton and Slim, 2012). The relatively 
good economic performance of Chile in the 1990s, based on the expansion and diversification of natural 
resource exports, was the result of structural reforms in previous decades. According to Díaz (2013, 
p. 219), liberal macroeconomic policies were consolidated in the 1990s and underlay the recovery of 
the economy. 
In summary, trade and financial liberalization policies became the main planks of most Latin 
American economies, and of the four leading economies in particular, decisively inaugurating a new 
pattern of growth led by market forces. 
3. Phase 3: a new growth regime of economic 
integration in an asymmetrical world (2000–2014)
Phase 3 began in the 2000s and was a time of greater integration into the world economy for all four 
economies. Growth in productivity and investment per worker recovered.25
The new growth regime of economic integration was the result of the market-oriented economic 
policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. These contributed to structural change that led to greater 
specialization in commodity production and, in the case of Mexico, involvement in global supply chains. 
With the support of liberal economic policies, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico underwent an industrial 
reorganization that allowed exports to increase from the 1980s to 2000, although the income effects 
of exchange-rate appreciation and the heavy dependence of industry on imported inputs in all the 
countries meant that imports grew even faster (see table 1). Even in 2003–2007, the period of fastest 
growth in Latin America since the Second World War, none of the four economies was able to reverse 
the structural trend and reduce the technological gap with more developed economies. 
In the case of Brazil, the recovery in the growth trajectory from 2000 onward can be judged 
weak. The growth trajectory is in the innovation part of the framework space, but productivity growth 
was lower than in phase 1 on average. This result can be interpreted as an inability on the part of 
policymakers to closely coordinate productivity-enhancing policies such as industrial, technological 
and trade policies with short-term macroeconomic policies (especially monetary and exchange-rate 
policies) (Bresser-Pereira, Nassif and Feijo, 2016; Nassif, Bresser-Pereira and Feijo, 2018). In other 
words, Brazil’s macroeconomic policy regime, which combines an inflation and fiscal targeting regime 
with a floating exchange-rate regime, has not been successful in increasing policy space for growth 
policies. The very conservative modus operandi of this Brazilian macroeconomic policy “tripod” has not 
been able either to bring short-term domestic interest rates down to anywhere near international levels 
or avoid a cyclical tendency to overvaluation of the Brazilian currency in real terms.
25 Carvalho (2008, p. 122) questions the resilience of liberal choices in view of the problems that most Latin American economies 
faced in the 1990s. According to the author, the deep crises of the 1990s did not alter the main characteristics of the financial 
regimes created in the liberalization process.   
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The macroeconomic policy orientation of the Mexican economy intensified the consolidation of 
the country’s export industries in the 2000s. Indeed, manufacturing exports expanded continuously 
at annual rates of over 10% until the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. 
According to Moreno (2016), this achievement is far from having translated into high and sustained growth 
free of financial or balance-of-payments crises. This is because all the efforts of the Mexican economy 
to integrate into NAFTA resulted in denationalization of the economy, with multinationals transferring 
very little to Mexico by way of technology and research and development facilities. The growth of the 
maquila sector entailed deindustrialization and, according to Ocampo (2016), all this happened despite 
a competitive real exchange rate, arrived at through wage repression and contractionary economic 
policies. In figure 2, Mexico is positioned in the accumulation part of the framework space.
In the case of Argentina, the economy plunged into a severe depression lasting from 1999–2002 
when the convertibility plan proved unsustainable. Recovery came from 2003 onward with the Kirchner 
administration and the implementation of policies to sustain aggregate demand. However, as pointed 
out by Porta (2016, p. 394), by late 2007 the growth trajectory was showing signs of considerable 
imbalances, most of which were rooted in the Argentine production structure. This diagnosis is based 
on the evidence that the Argentine production structure is centred on low-technology production 
(Porta, 2016, p. 402). Moreover, as pointed out by Cunha and Ferrari (2009), the process of economic 
recovery in the 2000s, involving a change of course in macroeconomic policy with respect to the 
neoliberal model in force until 2001–2002, should not be understood as a return to a developmental 
growth strategy. In a longer-term historical perspective, the authors suggest, the ending of the Kirchner 
era has shown that Argentine society remains much more willing to adhere to the liberal model, in its 
different versions, than to development strategies that seek to structurally change the production base 
(Cunha and Ferrari, 2009, p. 21).
The Chilean economy is the only one of the four economies that can be seen to have benefited 
from economic opening and specialization in natural resources. However, the country’s growth trajectory 
did not signal a change in growth regime from the 1950s. The Chilean economy’s growth capacity and 
export dynamism increased, then, although economic opening led to greater instability. Increased inflows 
of foreign capital and “Dutch disease” associated with copper exports have led to a prolonged cycle of 
real exchange-rate appreciation affecting the competitiveness of production and exports of goods and 
services with higher value added. Thus, productivity in the production structure is very heterogeneous 
and the Chilean economy is still very dependent on copper exports. Although macroeconomic indicators 
have been stable thanks to the implementation of consistent macroeconomic policies since the 1990s, 
the same progress has not been made with developmental or policy instruments to promote economic 
development (Díaz, 2013, pp. 246–252).
V. Concluding remarks
From the comparative analysis of the growth trajectories of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico we can conclude 
that the recent poor performance of these economies should not be seen as a cyclical phenomenon, 
but as the result of the way each was integrated into the world economy. In all cases, changes in the 
growth regime since the 1950s have entailed a narrowing of policy space and a scaling down of growth 
potential associated with increasing external vulnerability. 
Structural changes from the first phase (phase 1) to the last (phase 3) involved the development 
of industries specializing in commodities and low-technology manufactured goods (Argentina and Brazil) 
and high-technology maquila (Mexico). Furthermore, the framework space shows that productivity 
growth in all four economies was lower than in phase 1. Argentina showed the most unstable growth 
pattern, as its growth trajectory was close to the Harrodian corridor. 
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The long-term growth performance of Chile is quite distinct to all the others’, since it has maintained 
the same growth pattern for the last fifty years and has been able to diversify its production structure, 
although it is still essentially natural-resource-based.
Furthermore, the opening up of these economies before they could catch up with developed 
ones deepened their dependence on international capital flows. The long transition from phase 2 
to phase 3, that of economic integration, substantially changed the role of the State, which became less 
interventionist. Private investors with access to international financial markets became the main actors 
guiding investment decisions and capital accumulation. Thus, it can be said that the commitment to a 
developmentalist approach prevailing during the State-led industrialization phase gave way to criteria of 
short-term profitability. Stabilization policies became the priority for economic policymakers, and these 
narrowed the space for long-term economic policies. Their implementation resulted most of the time in 
higher real interest rates and lower real exchange rates, disincentivizing real-term capital accumulation. 
Thus, specialization in the production of low value added goods and increased financialization are 
phenomena that occurred together after economic opening reduced the policy space. 
Lastly, the boom in international trade in the 2000s “unleashed a wave of prosperity for developing 
economies, and Latin America in particular, that influenced their development and external trade and 
investment strategies” (De Souza and Ferraz, 2016, pp. 375–376). The 2008 international financial crisis 
brought about a sudden change in this situation. An open question is whether the semi-industrialized 
economies of this study are prepared for the period of lower international trade and greater financial 
uncertainties resulting from the hitherto slow recovery of developed economies. This question also 
raises a further issue, that of how much room for manoeuvre each economy has been left with in the 
effort to sustain growth. Now that market-oriented macroeconomic policies have been put in place 
and structural change has resulted in a shift towards low-technology industries, are these economies 
better placed to deal with an international slowdown in trade?
A menu of policy recommendations aimed at promoting a structural shift towards more technologically 
advanced sectors should provide for a consistent macroeconomic policy capable of widening the scope 
for industrial policy to achieve the best results in terms of dynamic economic change. Macroeconomic 
policies should be countercyclical, and accordingly management of capital flows should be an option to 
avoid capital volatility, which negatively affects nominal and real exchange rates. As for industrial policy, 
it should be designed to allow strategic decisions to be made about long-term economic development. 
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Annex A1
The framework space variables (see table A1.1) are constructed with data from the Penn World Tables, 
version 9.0, as follows:
• gv is the rate of growth in the ratio of real GDP at constant local prices (in millions of 2011 
dollars) to the number of persons employed (in millions).
• gi is the rate of growth in the ratio of capital stock at constant 2011 local prices (in millions 
of 2011 dollars) to the number of persons employed (in millions).
Table A1.1 
Estimated gv and gi as geometric means
Phase
Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
gv gi gv gi gv gi gv gi
1951–1981 1.5922 2.5927 3.70870 2.09340 2.1660 3.7082 3.18720 2.0081
1982–1999 0.3963 0.5124 0.14949 1.069462 1.8098 2.7287 –1.0925 0.1594
2000–2014 1.0488 0.8914 1.060694 0.721482 1.4214 2.9241 0.3756 1.7549
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of University of Groningen, Penn World Tables 9.0 [online database] https://
www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/pwt-releases/pwt9.0?lang=en.
